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This paper uses Blanchard's (1985) model to study the
relationship between budget deficits and trade deficits.
The model is applied to annual post-war data from the
U.S., Japan, andGermany. lfindthatinallthree countries
there is a significantlinkbetween tradedeficits andbudget
deficits, holding constant expected changes in GNP and
government expenditure. However, the implied planning
horizonsare quitedifferentacrosscountries. Inparticular,
the impliedplanninghorizon inthe U.S. is onlyabout3t04
years, whereas in Japan itis 71 years andin Germany itis
31 years.
The United States has run merchandise trade deficits for
eighteen straightyears. Including trade in services and net
interestreceipts alters the picture only siightiy, for itshows
the currentaccountindeficitfor fifteen ofthe pasteighteen
years. Many policymakers and journalists regard this re-
cent experience as symptomatic of some combination of
closed foreign markets and a secular decline inthe "com-
petitiveness" of U.S. products. Given this diagnosis, the
remedy then appears obvious-first, pry open foreign
markets where necessary through a process of aggressive
tit-for-tat bargaining, and second, preventafurthererosion
ofU.S. technological leadership by providing government
support to those industries that are deemed to be on the
cutting edge of new technology, especially iftheir foreign
counterparts are being subsidized.
This paper will argue that these policy prescriptions
representbogus curesfor anonex.istent illness. Ratherthan
reflecting a nefarious plot on the part of foreign govern-
ments to keep out U.S. products, or a gradual waning of
American·hegemony, recent U.S. trade imbalances repre-
sent to a large extent the predictable outcome ofmacro-
economic policies that have as much to do with the actions
ofCongress as they do with the actions offoreign govern-
ments. In particular, much ofthe size and persistence of
aggregate trade imbalances can be attributed to shifts in
national fiscal policies thatin turn lead to shifts in national
savings rates. If (at a constant interest rate) changes in
fiscal policy do not systematically affect domestic invest-
ment rates, then, via a well-known accounting identity,
equating current account deficits to the excess ofdomestic
investment over national savings, fiscal policy will neces-
sarily affect the current account. In particular, budget
deficits will lead to trade deficits.
The assertion thatbudgetdeficits leadto trade deficits is
not new. In fact, it has become the conventional wisdom
within the economics profession. As with other policy
issues, however, the economics profession has not been
entirely successful at getting the message across. This lack
ofsuccess can be ascribed to two factors, one theoretical
and one empirical.
First, from atheoretical standpoint, thereis no necessary
link: between budget deficits and trade deficits. Specifi-
cally, there will be no link: if "Ricardian Equivalence"
holds, that is, if individuals fully capitalize the implied
future taxes associated with budgetdeficits, eitherbecause20 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 3
they expect to live long enough to pay the future taxes
themselves, orbecause at the margin they value the wealth
of their descendants as much as they do their own. If
Ricardian Equivalence holds, then budget deficits that
simply reflect the intertemporal shifting of (lump-sum)
taxes will not affect national savings and the current
account, because changes in private saving will fully offset
changes ingovernmentsaving (see Barro 1974). Moreover,
we might observe a positive relationship between budget
deficits and trade deficits for reasons unrelated to how the
governmentfinances its expenditures. Forexample, a bud-
get deficit might not in fact signal higher future taxes if
individuals expect the government to restore a balanced
budget by cutting future government expenditures. In this
case, the anticipatedreduction ingovernmentexpenditures
raises private sector wealth and consumption, and there-
fore increases the trade deficit. l Alternatively, suppose a
budget deficit occurs because the government reduces
taxes on investment. In this case, even with full tax
discounting we would expect to observe a current account
deficit, not because national saving declines, but because
domestic investment increases. The point is that these
theoretical ambiguities provide ammunition for those who
wantto arguethatthe twindeficits areeitheranillusionora
coincidence. For example, conservatives tend to resist the
idea because they fear it will be used as an argument for
raising taxes. With perfectly valid economic arguments on
both sides ofthe issue, the door is then left wide open for
those who prefer the spurious arguments associated with
foreign trade barriers or declining national "competitive-
ness." Clearly, the extent to which individuals discount
future taxes is an empirical question, which can be settled
onlyby empiricalwork. This brings us to the second factor
behind the economics profession's failure to convince the
public that it is macroeconomic policy that is to blame for
persistentu.s. trade deficits.
On the face of it, existing empirical evidence against
Ricardian Equivalence and thus in favor ofthe notion that
budgetdeficits produce trade deficits is surprisingly weak,
despite the apparently strong evidence presented by the
experience of the U.S. during the 1980s.2 Studies that
examine different time periods or different countries have
failed to produce reliable evidence that budget deficits are
1. Yi (1993) argues that there is some evidencethat the U.S. trade deficit
ofthe 1980s occurred because individuals expected future government
purchases to decline.
2. For surveys ofthe empirical evidence on Ricardian Equivalence, see
Bernheim (1987) and Seater (1993). Bernheim tends to stress evidence
contradicting Ricardian Equivalence, while Seater tends to focus on
studies that support Ricardian Equivalence.
significantlyrelatedto trade deficits.3 Partofthereasonfor
this mixed evidence is undoubtedly due to difficulties that
plagueallempiricalworkineconomics, e.g.,difficultiesin
measuringtherelevanttheoreticalconcepts (inthis casethe
budget deficit), and difficulties in adequately controlling
for the many factors that simultaneously influence the
variables ofinterest. However, I believe that in the case of
the twin deficits, part of the reason also stems from
a failure to conduct empirical tests within the context ofa
clearly specified intertemporal optimization model.4
An intertemporal approach makes it clear that if we
simply regress current account deficits on contemporane-
ous values ofbudget deficits and on control variables like
government spending, investment, and GNP, we should
expect ambiguous results because the coefficients in this
sort of reduced-form relationship are complicated func-
tions ofunderlying parameters in the economy. Moreover,
this ambiguity arises from the inherently dynamic nature
ofthe twin deficits issue and in particular does not derive
from the usual sorts of simultaneity bias that clouds
econometric inference. For example, regardless of the
horizon of individuals, or of whether Ricardian Equiva-
lence holds, the coefficients on control variables like
government spending can be either positive or negative,
depending on the relationship between the horizon of
individuals and the perceived persistence of government
spending changes. Similarly, while the model in this paper
predicts that the (partial) correlation between current ac-
count deficits and budget deficits is unambiguously posi-
tive, the magnitude of this correlation can be arbitrarily
largeorsmallfor any finite horizonofindividuals, depend-
ing onthe perceivedpersistenceofbudgetdeficits. In other
words, the size of the coefficient on budget deficits does
not by itselftell us the extentto which individuals discount
future taxes. Instead, a clear picture of the twin deficits
relationrequiresajointestimationoftheprocessgenerating
the current account and the processes generating budget
deficits and the control variables, since economic theory
places cross-equation restrictions on these processes.
The remainderofthe paperis organized as follows. The
nextsectiondevelops adiscrete-timeversionofBlanchard's
(1985) model. In this model all individuals face the same
3. For example, using a standard reduced-form regression approach,
Bernheim (1988) shows that inferences about the strength of the twin
deficits relationship dependcritically on the country and time period, as
well as on the conditioning information set.
4. Anotable exception is the work ofLeiderman and Razin (1988), who
construct and test a model that is quite similar to the one in this paper.
They apply the model to monthly datafrom Israel during the early 1980s
and fail to reject the Ricardian Equivalence proposition.constant probability of death. This probability imparts a
finite horizon to individuals, and serves to parameterize
the extent to which Ricardian Equivalence holds and the
extent to which budget deficits affect the current account.
Estimation of this parameter will be a primary focus of
thepaper. SectionIIdiscusses the dataIuse to estimatethe
model. Briefly, I apply the model to the U.S., Japan, and
Germany, using as long a time series as I could obtain for
eachcount..ry. SectionIIIpresentsthe empiricalresults. Un-
restricted estimates reveal a statistically significant (par-
tial) correlation in all three countries between current
account deficits and budget deficits. Restricted estimates,
which allow us to inferthe effectiveplanning horizonofin-
dividuals, suggest wide disparities in the extent to which
individualsinternalizethe government'sbudgetconstraint.
Theestimates range from a 3- to 4-yearhorizon in the U.S.
to a 71-year horizon in Japan. Perhaps not surprisingly,
however, the horizons are not estimated very precisely. In
particular, their standarderrors do not allow us torejectthe
hypothesis that the horizons are short and equal across
countries. Section IV discusses some caveats and possible
extensions to the paper.
I. THE TWIN DEFICITS IN A MODEL
OF "PERPETUAL YOUTH"
This section briefly outlines a discrete-time version of
Blanchard's (1985) model. The analysis and notation bor-
row heavily from the work of Frenkel and Razin (1987),
and the interested reader is urged to consult their book for
full details.
The model will be developed in four steps. First, I
discuss the model's demographic assumptions. Second,
I solve the intertemporal optimizationproblemconfronting
individual agents inthe economy. Third, I aggregate the in-
dividual decision rules to arrive at an aggregate consump-
tion function. Inthe fourth step, Iincorporatedomestic and
foreign government borrowing, and derive an equilibrium
law of motion for the economy's current account balance.
Demographics
Consider a world in which a new cohort ofindividuals is
borneach period. Withoutloss ofgenerality, normalize the
size of each new cohort to be one. All members· of this
cohort have the same probability of surviving from one
period to the next, and more importantly, this survival
probability remains constant throughout an individual's
life. In other words, an individual's lifetime is like a
sequence of coin tosses, the probability of living for
another year being completely independentofthe individ-
ual's current age. Clearly, these demographic assumptions
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are motivated by analytical convenience rather than by
descriptiverealism.5 Inparticular, the assumptionsthatthe
survival probability is the same for everyone and that it
remains constant over time greatly facilitate aggregation.
In this world, the only redistributions that matter are
between the currently living and the yet unborn. If al-
lowance were made for more realistic individual life-cycle
dynamics, then we would also need to worry about how
government policy redistributes resources among all those
who are currently living, eachofwhomwillrespondto the
policy in a different way because ofage differences.
Although the assumption ofconstant and identical sur-
vival rates is important, the particularvalues chosenfor the
birthrateandthe deathrateareinessential. Forexample, we
knowfromWeil (1989) thatvirtuallyidenticalresults canbe
derivedinaframeworkinwhichindividualsliveforeverand
new (unrelated) individuals areborneachperiod. InWeil's
model the birth rate rather than the survival rate becomes
the key parameter. In fact, by reinterpreting the param-
eters, the two models become observationally equivalent.
Specifically, Blanchard and Weil's models will produce
identical results if we set the birth rate in Weil's model
equalto the deathrate inBlanchard's, andthenincreasethe
interest rate in Weil's model by Blanchard's d~ath rate. 6
Thus, a finite horizon per se is not the crucial issue here,
although it provides a convenient story for debt non-
neutrality. Instead, as noted by Buiter (1988), the crucial
issue is that new individuals enter the economy each
period, and that these individuals are unrelated (in utility
terms) to currently alive individuals. These unborn indi-
viduals introduce a wedge between the government's fu-
ture tax base and the future tax base of those who are
currently living. This wedge then causes social andprivate
discount rates to diverge, and it is this distortion that is the
fundamental source of debt nonneutrality and the twin
deficits.
Following Frenkel and Razin (1987), let'Y denote an in-
dividual's probability ofsurviving from one period to the
next. Then, from the previous assumptions, 'Yt is the prob-
ability that an individual will live for t more years, and
more generally, an individual's expected lifetime is
00
.! j-yj = 'Y/(I-'Y)2.
)=1
5. Blanchard cites evidence that survival rates are high and relatively
constant from ages 20 to 40, but start to decline rapidly thereafter,
reaching.99 at age 50, .97 atage 60, .84 at age 80, and .33 at age 100.
To accord with this evidence on individual survival rates, Blanchard
suggests an alternative interpretation of the model in which the basic
unit ofanalysis is a dynastic household, and the survival rate refers to
the probability that some member ofthe family continues to live.
6. See Glick and Rogoff (1994) for an application ofWeil's model to
issues in international macroeconomics.22 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 3
8. See, e.g., Frenkel and Razin (1987).
The Government
Aggregation
In solving for the individual'soptimal consumption/sav-
ing plan, Iassumethe individual'speriodutilityfunction is
quadratic. Specifically,
U(C) = <Xc - Y2c2 t t t
where Ct, Yo and Tt denote aggregate percapitaconsump-
tion, labor income, and taxes which, from ourprevious as-
sumptions, are the same as ct' Yo and Tt.
The point to notice is that atthe aggregate level, the rate
ofreturn on private debt is justthe risk-freemarket interest
rate. From the law oflarge numbers, the risk premium is
cancelled by those who die each period.
For simplicity, I assume the country inquestion is "small"
in the sense that it takes as given the world interest rate, R.
Themainimplicationofthis assumptionis that application
ofthe model to large countries will tend to exaggerate the
effect of fiscal policy on the current account. This is be-
cause in large countries partofthe effectoffiscal policy is
reflected in the (world) interest rate.
Atthis pointI also remind the readerofa second impor-
tant assumption implicit in the above setup, namely, the
where now ba,t denotes thedebtattimetofindividuals who
are a years old. Aggregating both sides ofthe individual's
budget constraint in (3) yields,
(8) Bt = R . Bt_1 + Ct - (Yt - Tt),
Since it is assumed that labor, income, and taxes are the
same for everyone, and the demographics imply an age
independent consumption function, the only issue in ag-
gregating concerns private sector indebtedness. Letting Bt
denote aggregate per capita private sector debt, we have
00
(7) Bt = (1--y) a~o -yaba,f'
where Ht denotes the capitalized value ofthe individual's
expected future disposable income,
00 (-y)j Ht = Et j~O R (Yt+j-Tt+)·
(4)
Maximizing (2) subject to (3) then gives the following
linear, age-independent consumption function (assuming
oR = 1),8
(5) ct = [(R--y)/R] [Ht-(RI-y)bt_1]
(6)
00
(1) max Eo I. flU(ct),
{c,} ,=0
where°denotes the individual's subjective rate of time
preference and ct denotes consumption during period t.
The expectation operator in (1), Eo, reflects uncertainty
overboththe duration ofthe individual'slifetime andhis or
her future resources. The previous demographic assump-
tions allow us to write this as,
Thus, in a very simple and convenient way, -y parameter-
izes the horizonofindividuals. Finally, from ournormaliz-
ation that the size of a new cohort is one, the total
population at any given time is constant and equal to
I.;=o-yj=lJ(1-'Y) (assuming that each cohort is large
enough for the law of large numbers to apply).
7. Following Yaari (1965), an alternative but effectively equivalent
arrangementwouldhave individuals buylife insurance policies inwhich
insurance companies honor the debts of the deceased or receive their
assets, whatever the case may be. Under this setup, borrowing and
lending takes place at the risk-free rate, but adding in the individual's
insurance premiums leads to an identical expected rate of return on
human capital.
00
(2) max Eo I. (-yoYU(ct)
{c,} t=O
where now the expectation operator, Eo, only reflects
uncertainty about future resources, and the consumer's
effective discount rate has increased.
Individuals receive an exogenous stochastic labor in-
come stream, {Yt}, whichis assumed to be identical across
individuals, and must pay a stochastic lump-sum tax ofTt
to the government during period t. In general, variation
over time in disposable income will cause individuals to
want to borrow and lend. However, no one will be willing
to lend to an individual unless he or she receives a "risk
premium" to cover the probability that the borrower will
die before the debt is paid off. Specifically, letR= (1+r),
where rdenotes the risk-free market interest rate. Then, in
competitive equilibrium, the (gross) rate of interest on
personal loans will be RI-y, since this guarantees an
expected return equal to the risk-free rate. 7 Therefore, the
individual's flow budget constraint is
(3) ct = Yt - Tt + bt - R/-y bt_1
where bt denotes period t issues of (one-period) private
sector debt.
Individuals are assumed to maximize their expected life-
time utility,
Individual Optimizationassumption that domestic output evolves exogenously, in-
dependent of both the current account and the govern-
ment's fiscal policy. In principle, of course, we should
make output endogenous by introducing a production
function and modeling investment and labor supply deci-
sions. After all, as was noted earlier, the current account
balance is by definition the difference between investment
and national saving. My strategy in this paper, however, is
to seehowmuchofthe dynamicsinthecurrentaccountcan
be explained solely on the basis of fiscal policy-induced
savings rate dynamics. The dangerwith this strategy is the
potential ofgetting a misleading picture ofthe underlying
reason why fiscal policy affects the current account, if
indeed fiscal policy simultaneously influences both saving
and investment.9
Having said this, we can now move on and derive an
equation for the current account balance. First, define CAt
to be the economy's current account surplus. Remember
that this is simply the economy's net acquisition offoreign
assets during period t. Therefore, an economy will have a
current accountsurplus when it spends less than it pro-
duces during a given period. That is,
(9) CAt = Yt - Gt - Ct + rFt_1 ,
where Gt denotes government purchases during period t,
andFt denotes tbe economy's stockofnetexternal assets at
the end ofperiod t.
Now, if we difference both sides of the accounting
identity in (9), and use the fact that, by definition CAt =
Ft - Ft_1, we get
(10) CAt = R· CAt_1 +~ Yt - ~Gt - ~Ct.
Next, aggregate the consumption function givenin(5) and
substituteitinto (10), usingthe following three facts. First,
note that by definition the sum ofaggregate private sector
indebtedness, Bt, and government debt, Dr> is equal to net
externaldebt, -Ft. Thatis,Bt+Dt=-F(" This allows us to
write the aggregate consumption function in terms ofag-
gregate per capita human capital, Ht, net external assets,
Ft, and government debt, Dt. Second, use the government
budget constraint,
(11) Dt = R . Dt-1 + Gt - Tt
to writeHtin terms ofexpectedfuture values ofYt,Dt' and
Gt. Third, note thatthechange ingovernmentdebt,~t' is
9. Glick and Rogoff(1992) develop an intertemporal optimizing model
of the current account that simultaneously incorporates saving and
investment dynamics. They focus their attention, however, on the
importance of distinguishing global and country-specific productivity
shocks, rather than on the effects ofbudget deficits.
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by definition equal to the government's (interest inclusive)
budget deficit. Specifically, letting BSt denote the govern-
ment'stimetbudgetsurplus, we haveBSt = - ~t" Doing
all this yields the following expression for the equilibrium
current account balance,
(12) CAt = 'YCAt_l + i Et_1(~Yt- ~Gt)
( R-'Y~ 00 ('YV + -~- IE'_1 .I. D 1 (~Gt+j- Yt+)
, J( ). "J=l ,H)
+ (l-'Y)(R~'Y )Et-lj~O (i JBSt+j + ut·
This equation is the main result ofthe model. It explains
the current account balance in terms offive driving forces.
The first component on the right-hand side of (12) repre-
sents anautoregressiveeffectwhichlinks persistenceinthe
current account to the horizon ofindividuals. Specifically,
the longer is the effective planning horizon, the more per-
sistent are fluctuations in the current account. The second
componentonthe right-handsideof(12) is acurrentperiod
demand effect, which simply says that, all else equal, the
current account surplus increases when available output
increases this period more than does the government's de-
mand for it. The third and fourth terms on the right-hand
side of(12) are more interesting. Thethird termis a wealth
effectarising from expectedchanges in government spend-
ing and output.Ifindividuals expect government spending
to rise faster than output, then private sector wealth de-
clines. The decline in wealth reduces current consump-
tion, and therefore increases the current account surplus
(i.e., individuals begin to save now for the anticipated de-
clineintheirfuture disposable income). Thefourth termon
the right-hand side of (12) is what sets this model apart
from standard applications ofthe Permanent Income Hy-
pothesis to current account dynamics. 1O Specifically, it
implies that budget deficits produce current account defi-
cits. This, of course, is the "twin deficits" phenomenon.
There are two points to notice aboutthis component. First,
itdisappears when individuals have infinite horizons (i.e.,
when'Y = 1). Holdingcurrentandfuture governmentspend-
ing constant, budgetdeficits justrepresentthe intertempo-
ral shifting of taxes. If individuals fully capitalize these
future taxes then suchtax shiftingcauses no wealth effects,
which inthis model is the only way fiscal policy caninflu-
ence the path ofthe current account. The second point is
that the effect ofbudget surpluses on the current account
depends not just on the current realization of the govern-
ment's budget surplus, but also on the entire expected
10. See, e.g., Sheffrin and Woo (1990).24 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 3
future path ofthe budget surplus. Finally, the last term in
(12), Up represents revisions between periodt-1 and pe-
riodtofindividual's expectations concerning future values
ofincome, government spending, andthe budgetdeficit. If
expectations are rational, this term will be uncorrelated
withanything in the time t - 1information setandwill also
be serially uncorrelated. Therefore, ut is a valid regression
equation error term.
Becausethe current account depends on expected future
values of BSt, Yt, and Gt, in order to impiement equa-
tion (12) empirically we must take a stand on the nature of
the stochastic processes generating these variables. In
general, there is every reasonto believethatthese variables
are jointly determined within some larger econo~ic sys-
tem, and therefore should be forecasted using some sort of,
VAR. However, in the interests ofsimplicity, I employ the
following univariate time series specifications for these
variables:11
(13) BSt = «I + «BS BSt_1 + Elt
(14) dYt = «2 + TJe fLt + «ydYt_1 + E2t
(15) dGt = «3 + TJe fLt + «GdGt-l + E3t·




(16) CAt = «0 + -yCAt_1 + «BS R _ BSt_1 -Y«BS
+ «y [R'1 - «y(R--y) ]dY
R ~ -Y«y t-I
- (XG [i - i~-y~:) ]dGt_1 + ut ·
Equations (13)-(16) clearly illustrate the nature of the
cross-equationrestrictions impliedby the model. Inpartic-
ular, note that the response coefficients in the current
accountequation dependon the autoregressive coefficients
in the equations governing the evolution ofBSt, dYt, and
l!t.Gt• As noted in the introduction, this makes itdifficult to
interpretsingle-equationregressions ofthecurrentaccount
on other variables. For example, note that the response of
the current account to changes in output and government
spendingcango eitherway, depending onthe relative mag-
nitudes ofthe horizon parameter, -y, and the persistence of
changes in output and government spending, as deter-
mined by the parameters «yand (XG'
11. Note, G,andf,areassumedto share acommon (deterministic) trend
which, from inspection of (12), cancels out of the current account
equation.
Also note that the persistence ofbudgetdeficits plays an
important role in determining the (contemporaneous) re-
sponse of the current account to a budget deficit. In
particular, the more persistent a budget deficit is expected
to be, the more likely it is that currently alive individuals
will die before taxes are raised, and therefore the larger is
the wealth effect. However, as pointed out by Poterba and
Summers (1987), even if budget deficits are very persis-
tent, the wealtheffectandtherefore the (contemporaneous)
response ofthe current account are small if individuals
have "long" but finite horizons. For example, suppose
-y = .87 and R= 1.02, so that individuals have approx-
imately a 51-year horizon and the real interest rate is 2
percent. Then, even in the limitas (XBSfLO, the coefficient
on BSt is only .13.
Beforeconcluding thatthe model produces smalleffects
from budget deficits, however, it should be remembered
thatinadynamic multivariatemodel, contemporaneousre-
sponses may understate the potential ofbudget deficits to
affect the current account. This is because an initial re-
sponse may cumulate over time before itbegins to die out.
Such amplification occurs in this model if-y+(XBS>1. For
example, suppose that -y= .87 and «BS= .7. In this case,
the initial response of the current account to a budget
deficit shock will only be about 15 percent the size ofthe
response after justtwo periods.
ll. THE DATA
The model in Section I is applied to annual post-war data
from the U.S., Japan, and Germany. Of course, none of
these countries satisfies the "small" country assumption
ofthe model, but except for the U.S. during the 1950s and
1960s, the assumption might not be too bad. Due to data
availability problems, the sample varies from country to
country. For the U.S.,the sampleextends from 1950-1993,
while for Japan and Germany I was forced to use shorter
samples, 1960-1992and1968-1993,respectively. Dataare
from NIPA for the U.S., and from the OEeDfor Japan and
Germany.
Without a doubt, the variable in the model that is most
difficult to measure is the government budget deficit. In
this paper I make no attempt to correct the standard
reported series for any of the many potential biases to
which these data are subject. Fourpoints about the budget
data shouldbemade, however. First, for all three countries
Imeasuredeficits inreferencetothe "general" or"consol-
idated" government. That is, state and local balances are
added to federal or central government balances. Second,
sinceI definethebudgetdeficitas thechangeinthe govern-
ment's debt, I use data on the interest inclusive deficit (as
opposed to the primary deficit). Third, the data includeKASA/ FINITE HORIZONS AND THE TWIN DEFICITS 25
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social security payments and tax revenues. This becomes
importantfor the U.S. and Japan starting in the late 1970s.
Fourth, rather than express everything in real terms, I
simply divide both sides ofequation (16) by nominal GNP,
and express everything as a share ofnominal GNP.
Plots of the current account and budget surplus as a
share ofGNP are contained in Figures 1-3. These figures
suggestthatwhilethere appears to besome sortofrelation-
shin hetween the twin deficits. the stren!!th of the rela- ----r - - ~ -- - - -- --. - _. _. .. -- - - - - ~ - '-"
tionship varies over time. In general, the relationship
appears to be closerinall three countries during the 1980s.
The figures also illustratethat the two series arenot always
"inphase". These two facts suggest that it is important to
control for other factors that are influencing the current
account balance and to allow for some dynamics.
To get a better sense ofthe dynamics in the data, Figure
4 presents impulse responses computed from unrestricted
bivariate VAR(2) models consisting ofthe currentaccount
and the budget surplus (both expressed as a share of
GNP). 12 Note that in all three countries a positive shock to
the budget surplus produces a current account surplus that
peaks after two to three years, and then gradually moves
back toward baiance-adynamic version ofthe twin defi-
cits story. The main difference across countries is that
Germany's response appears to be weaker and shorter-
lived than in the U.S. and Japan, while the U.S. response
appears to be more persistent than in Japan and Germany.
This section presents joint maximum likelihood estimates
ofthesystemofequations(13)-(16). Inadditiontotheusual
assumptions about the error terms, I remind the reader of
two important statistical assumptions that are made when
computing the estimates that impose restrictions on the
nature ofthe economic equilibrium. First, remember that I
am assuming output is exogenous. Ofcourse, this cannot
literally be true. Imports and exports affect GNP, just as
GNP affects imports and exports. Still, what is important
is that this feedback not be too strong. Otherwise we can
expect to obtain inconsistent parameter estimates. The
second assumption is that there is no feedback from an
economy's external balance to its fiscal policy variables.
Again, I regard this as a reasonable assumption, although
some observers have argued that external balance consid-
erations influence congressional budget deliberations. As
noted in the introduction, however, most members of
Congress seem to see other culprits behind the persistent
m. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
12. The equations are ordered so thatchanges in the budget surplus have
no contemporaneous effect on the current account.26 FRBSF ECONOMIC REvIEW 1994, NUMBER 3
13. From (12), whatmatters is the effective discountrate, 'YIR. RaisingR
should increase our estimate of'Y by the same percentage. For example,
ifinitially R=1.02 and we estimate 'Y=.8, then increasing R by 1per-
cent to 1.0302 should lead to an estimate of 'Y = .808. I tried estimat-
ing the model for a 1percent and 3percent real interest rate and found
that the results changed little and in the predicted direction.
U.S. trade imbalance. Inanycase, ifinstrumentalvariables
can be found, these exogeneity assumptions can be tested
via a Hausman test, for example. If this test rejects we
should resort to an Instrumental Variables estimator.
Before presenting estimates ofthe restricted system, let
mebriefly describethe results ofunrestrictedestimationof
the current account equation. (Actually, I estimate the
currentaccountequationjointlywiththe otherequations to
take advantage of potential correlation. among th.e errOi
terms. I refer to the estimates as unrestricted because I do
not impose the cross-equation constraints on the coeffi-
cients.) As noted earlier, only in the case of the budget
surplus do we have any expectation concerning the sign of
the coefficient. Inparticular, ifthe twindeficits hypothesis
is valid, the coefficient on BSt should be positive. This is
indeed the case. Unrestricted estimates of the budget
surplus coefficient are .266, .064, and .515 for the U.S.,
Japan, and Germany, respectively. The associated t statis-
tics are 5.26, 0.82, and 2.68.
Finally, Table 1 contains estimates of the underlying
parameters, derived by imposing the cross-equation re-
strictions. In each case I simply fix the value ofthe interest
rate to be 2 percent, i.e., R = 1.02.13 The first point to
notice is that the fit ofthe model appears to be reasonably
good, in the sense that the current account equation ex-
plains 82 percent of the variation in the U.S. current
account, and about 60 percent of the variation in the
Japanese and German currentaccounts. On the down side,
however, note that for Germany the cross-equation restric-
tions are soundlyrejected, as the5percentcriticalvaluefor
a X2(3) random variable is only 7.81. Also note that
for the U.S. and Germany there is borderline evidence
against the hypothesis ofno residual (first-order) autocor-
relation. This casts doubt, beyond the usual small sample
considerations, on the validity ofthe standard errors.
Turning to estimates of the horizon parameter, 'Y, note
that while this parameter appears to be relatively precisely
estimated, when we feed these estimates into the formula
for an individual's expected lifetime (i.e., 'Y/(1-'Y)l), we
get far less precise estimates of the effective planning
horizon. For example, the 95 percent confidence intervals
reported below the horizon estimates indicate that we
cannot even reject Ricardian Equivalence (i.e., an infinite
horizon) for Japan and Germany. This is because the
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-0.2 +--~-...,---r---i---r---r-- .....---r--,formula starts to becomequite sensitive to smallvariations
in 'Yonce 'Y starts to reach about .80. Ofcourse, this is not
too surprising since, with discounting, it makes very little
difference whether we calculate present values including
50 years or including 100 years. In other words, we will
never be able to tell reliably whether individuals have 50-
year planning horizons or whether they have 100-year
planning horizons. Fortunately, this sort of distinction is
rarely important in econorrJic policymaking. Ofpotentially
more importance, however, are differences like that ex-
hibited by the U.S. and Japan, in which the U.S. is esti-
matedto have a horizon ofonly a few years, whileJapan is
estimated to have a horizon ofabout 70 years. Of course,
differences of this magnitude should manifest themselves
in other data sets. Thus, it would be of interest to cross-
check these results with other studies. One example of a
study yielding results on the implicit planning horizon of
individuals is Hayashi's (1982) paper on the Permanent
Income Hypothesis. Using time-series data on aggregate
TABLE 1
RESTRICTED ESTIMATES OF EQUATIONS (13)-(16)
USA JAPAN GERMANY
Sample 1952-1993 1962-1992 1970-1993
'Y .596 .888 .836
(.078) (.063) (.131)
aBS .738 .908 .553
(.077) (.061) (.137)
aY .894 .473 .395
(.082) (.153) (.147)
aG .775 .772 .208
(.109) (.094) (.194)
Horizon 3.66 71.3 31.1
(1.40, 12.2) (13.4,00) (3.2,00)
R2 .82 .59 .56
h stat 1.95 1.01 1.82
LR(3) 6.31 3.69 20.7
NOTES:
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Horizon computed as 'Y/(1-'Y)2.
R2 and h stat pertain to the current account equation.
LR(3) is the likelihood ratio statistic for the system's three overidentify-
ing restrictions.
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U.S. consumption and income, Hayashi's estimates imply
roughly a lO-year planning horizon. One potential expla-
nation ofthis relatively shorthorizon, pursuedby Hayashi,
is that part ofthe U.S. population is subject to liquidity or
borrowing constraints, making their behavior appear my-
opic. For example, his estimates suggest that approx-
imately 17 percent of the U.S. population faces binding
liquidity constraints. However, while liquidity constraints
might explain a lov/=horizon estimate for a particular
country, such constraints seem ill-suited to explain the
cross~sectional difference between the U.S. and Japan.
That is, it seems implausible that capital market imperfec-
tions are more severe in the U.S. than in Japan.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper developed and estimated a dynamic econo-
metric model of the current account. This model links
persistence in trade imbalances to the effective planning
horizons of individuals. The longer their horizons (as
measured by their "expected lifetimes"), the more per-
sistent will be the economy's aggregate trade imbalances.
The model also illustrates the importance of individuals'
horizons to the notionofthe "twindeficits". Allelseequal,
the longer individuals' horizons are, the weakerwill bethe
relationship between budget deficits and trade deficits.
This is becausebudgetdeficits affectthe economy solelyby
altering the timing oftaxes. Shifting taxes to the future by
running a budget deficit will not create much ofa wealth
effect ifindividuals expect to be around to pay the higher
future taxes.14 Not surprisingly, it is difficult to estimate
this parameter precisely using relatively short time-series
data. Nonetheless, the point estimates suggest wide dis-
parities in planning horizons among the U.S., Japan, and
Germany. Specifically, the U.S. seems to have a much
shorter effective planning horizon than Japan, with Ger-
many somewhere in the middle. Itwould be interesting to
cross-check these results using more direct, and probably
more reliable, micro data sets.
Finally, in deriving these results I have made many
simplifying assumptions. Future work along these lines
should attempt to relax some of these to make sure the
inferences hold up. Probably the two most important
extensions would be, first, to "endogenize" output move-
ments by modeling investment, and second, to relax the
"smallcountry" assumption by allowing acountry's fiscal
policy to affect the equilibrium world interest rate.
14. Or they expect their children, or other people they care about, to be
around.28 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 3
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